"Mr. Baker pledged to seek from Congress $1 billion… to signal private foreign investors
that it is safe to commit their own funds to the Philippines" (Friedman 1989 ). Does development aid attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in post-conflict countries? This paper contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of FDI by explaining how aid is a signal that can attract FDI. Post-conflict situations are relatively information-poor because of the effects of conflict. Before investing in these countries, firms look at a variety of signals. We argue that the decision to send aid to a country signals the donors' trust of local authorities. What matters is the presence of aid, whether or not the aid has achieved its intended purpose. This signaling effect of aid has not yet been addressed. We also argue that this impact of development aid is conditional on whether the aid can be viewed as geostrategic or not. Most aid should signal a better environment for FDI, but aid seen as geostrategic could deter investors. Our results provide support for our argument, suggesting that in post-conflict countries non-strategic aid attracts FDI.
This topic has important implications for the literatures on FDI and aid. Global FDI flows have increased substantially in recent decades, and scholars have attempted to explain why some countries receive more FDI than others (e.g., Blanton and Blanton 2007; Büthe and Milner 2008) .
attention. Post-conflict countries need to recover from infrastructure damage and other consequences, and are prone to see conflict break out again (Collier 2003 ) -increasing investors' concerns about risk (Jensen and Young 2008 ) -so they are especially worth understanding.
In the next section, we review the literature on determinants of FDI, and the debate about the effects of aid. Then, we discuss the growing literature on the relationship between aid and FDI.
In the third section, we present a theory of aid as a signal to investors. We argue that the type of signal should differ depending on whether aid is viewed as geostrategic or not, and that the informational effect of aid should vanish as time elapses since the end of the conflict. In the fourth section, we describe our empirical analysis. The fifth section concludes.
agreements (Büthe and Milner 2008; Manger 2009 ) and bilateral investment treaties (Desbordes and Vicard 2009; Neumayer and Spess 2005) .
Less explored is how information availability affects FDI. Hooper and Kim found that higher opacity tends to reduce capital inflows, but opacity regarding accounting and regulations are associated with more FDI (Hooper and Kim 2007:36) . However, how do investors make decisions about countries where information is relatively scarce? This paper presents a theory about how foreign aid can provide information to investors when reliable information is limited.
Consequences of development aid
A substantial body of research attempts to determine if foreign aid improves economic growth in developing countries, but the results are mixed. While some single-country studies have shown a positive impact of aid, macro studies have often not offered support (e.g., Boone 1996; Easterly 2001) .
1 Some studies have found aid improves growth, but only conditionally upon other factors.
For example, Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that aid can lead to growth in countries with good economic policy. However, the results of conditional relationships seem fragile. Roodman (2007) tests the robustness of 14 conditional models of aid and growth, and finds the results very sensitive to model specification and sample size. Overall, the effects of aid on growth are not clear.
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The aid efficacy studies have generally examined whether development aid has had its intended consequence. A small but growing body of research looks at aid's unintended consequences.
The most prominent line in this area of inquiry explores how aid affects regime type and related characteristics (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Knack 2001 Knack , 2004 Morrison 2007 Morrison , 2009 ).
Other research finds links between aid and the risk of armed conflict (Nielsen et al. 2011 ) and military spending increases (Collier and Hoeffler 2007) .
This paper looks at a different unintended consequence of aid: its impact on FDI. FDI offers potential benefits to recipient countries, so if aid can attract FDI, this would suggest an additional possible mechanism linking aid to growth -though indirectly. 3 A handful of studies have looked at connections between aid and FDI, although much remains unclear.
The impact of development aid on FDI
In theory, several channels could link foreign aid to increased FDI. Kimura and Tod (2010:482-3) mention three channels with positive effects on FDI (infrastructure, finance and vanguard effects) and two with negative effects (rent-seeking and "Dutch disease" effects). 4 However, the few articles that empirically examine the direct connection between aid and FDI generally find no significant relationship. These studies analyze the impact of aggregate aid (Harms and Lutz 2006; Karakaplan, Neyapti and Sayek 2005) , and distinguish between aid for infrastructure or for non-infrastructure (Kimura and Tod 2010) . Among the positive results, Karakaplan et al. (2005) find that aid leads to FDI only in cases of good governance and financial market development. Kimura and Tod find that only Japanese aid for infrastructure seems to promote Japanese FDI (in line with Blaise 2005 ). This appears to be a phenomenon unique to Japan, because they do not find this result for any other donor.
Overall, while there are many channels through which aid might encourage FDI, empirical results have not shown much support for these channels. Virtually no studies have found an unconditional relationship between aid and FDI. In this paper we explore a different channel through which aid can contribute to increased FDI, signaling. This should be helpful in a particular set of countries: countries that have recently experienced a war in their territory.
Theory: The informational effect of development aid Information is a crucial component in the decision to invest in a country (Mody, Sadka and Razin 2003) . However, while the literature has identified a series of determinants of FDI, it assumes that the ability of investors to access information about these factors (e.g., market size or potential, institutions that may affect investments), and the reliability of such information are relatively homogeneous across countries. 6 This is problematic for two reasons. First, investors do not always have access to all the relevant information that would be desirable before investing in a particular country. Second, potential recipient governments have incentives to offer enticements for investment, but information about the government's type -its willingness or ability to commit to certain policies -may not be available. How do investors decide whether to take advantage of opportunities without all the relevant information about the country? Recent work in the field of behavioral finance uses psychology to explain investor behavior that cannot be explained with traditional financial and economic theory (Krishnamurti 2009:628) . Furthermore, recent studies show that investors rely on informational shortcuts (Biglaiser, Hicks and Huggins 2008; Gray 2009 ).
Post-conflict situations are especially information-poor, even compared to other developing countries. Regarding developing countries generally, investors can access information about the economic and political situation from government sources, the press, international governmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs), and private sources (i.e., other companies).
In post-conflict countries, however, data from official sources can be unreliable because of the consequences of the conflict on the country's administration (and its ability to gather and report accurate information), or because of possible government's incentives to misrepresent the data (Collier 1999; Murdoch and Sandler 2002) . For these reasons, there should be less information coming from post-conflict governments, and this information should be less reliable than information from other states.
Additionally, a significant part of the information distributed by IGOs comes from governmental sources. Depending on the magnitude of the conflict and the government type, the work of the press and NGOs can be limited. Furthermore, the information gathered by these sources does not necessarily provide the data required for investment decisions. Finally, conflicts are usually associated with FDI withdrawal (Busse and Hefeker 2007) , potentially limiting the information provided by established foreign companies. Overall, post-conflict developing countries are especially low-information environments.
In brief, before investing, firms look at a variety of data sources. In post-conflict countries,
given the heightened need for financing, sources affiliated with the potential recipient government may not be credible. Our assertion thus far is that aid provides a signal that a country is safe to invest in, compared with other post-conflict countries. Here we add a substantial caveat: in order for aid to work in the manner that we describe, it should not be seen as a strategic enticement in a geopolitical relationship.
Geostrategic aid, seen as primarily intended to provide security benefits to the donor (see below),
should not provide such a positive signal. Aid that cannot be considered geostrategic, however,
should provide an important signal about trust in local authorities regarding the "acceptable" use of aid. Therefore, in post-conflict countries, non-geostrategic foreign aid should have a positive signaling effect and attract FDI.
Hypothesis 1: In post-conflict situations, non-geostrategic foreign aid is positively associated with FDI
It could be argued that international aid fosters investment through channels other than information. For example, it is possible that the connection between aid and FDI is through aid's contribution to economic and social capital (the "infrastructure effect," Dollar and Easterly 1999:573) . There are two reasons why this is not necessarily the case. First, as the literature discussed above indicates, it is far from clear that aid regularly has a positive effect on the economy (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2008) . Additionally, for aid to affect FDI through aid's intended effects, investors would have to believe in the efficacy of aid. This is not a given, considering the general level of skepticism of aid in business circles and the media (e.g., Dorn 2004; Mills 2009; Stephens 2010) . Second, aid's informational effect on FDI should be relatively fast, but infrastructure takes longer to actually increase the host country's economic or social capital, and then attract FDI.
According to our argument, in initial years after a conflict, the amount of aid received by the host country should signal some level of confidence in the country. What matters is the presence of aid, whether or not the aid has actually accomplished the goals set forth by donors.
Because the argument emphasizes aid's informational effect, and not its intended development consequences, we focus on specific types of aid. Our argument is about bilateral aid in particular. Aid is an important signal because it indicates a characterization the donor country has made about the recipient. Multilateral aid responds to different determinants than bilateral aid (e.g., Therefore, multilateral aid should provide a noisier and less useful signal to investors.
Within bilateral aid, aid from the United States is more likely to be motivated by geostrategic reasons, and therefore we expect it to have different effects than aid provided by other states. The preceding hypothesis applies to non-U.S. aid, and the discussion below explains why we expect U.S.
aid to have a different signaling effect to foreign investors.
The peculiarity of U.S. aid flows and the information they provide
The U.S. is seen as a unique aid donor for two primary reasons: First, it donates more than any other country. 14 Second, and more importantly for signaling implications, U.S. aid is seen as especially geostrategic. By geostrategic we mean motivated by global security concerns. This is different from -and often inconsistent with -economic or other concerns. The goal of U.S. aid in many cases is to get a recipient country to participate in a wartime coalition, 15 allow U.S. troops to use local military facilities, 16 or to help keep a domestically unpopular regime in place -because this regime supports U.S. security policies. 17 These geostrategic goals are relatively unique to the United States, with its hegemonic status and troops deployed to all regions of the world.
A number of studies suggest that U.S. aid during the Cold War was based more on geopolitics than development (Boschini and Olofsgard 2007; Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998) .
Security goals continued to shape U.S. aid commitments through the 1990s (Boschini and Olofsgard 2007; Lai 2003) . More recently, the "War on Terrorism" has seemed to influence aid provision in ways comparable to those of the Cold War (Buzan 2006; Fleck and Kilby 2010) . While there are multiple mechanisms for how U.S. aid is specifically used for geopolitical ends, several studies suggest vote-buying at the United Nations. 18 Kuziemko and Werker (2006) argue that U.S. aid is The assumption that U.S. aid is generally more geostrategic than aid from other countries does not imply that non-U.S. aid is altruistic. Some development aid might be motivated by humanitarian concerns (Lumsdaine 1993 ), but research shows that a great deal of aid is motivated by donors' interests (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009 ). 19 However, geostrategic interest is different from simple economic interest in that aid given for the former reason is designed to ensure that the regime follows certain security policies, and possibly also to ensure that the regime can stay in power -because of shared security interests.
These goals, as opposed to the goals associated with economically-motivated aid, are less likely to be in line with the interests of investors.
We argue that the signaling effect of U.S. aid, because of its geostrategic nature, should have the opposite impact of the non-geostrategic aid. Because U.S. aid is based on factors other than potential for economic development or simply need, investors might disregard U.S. aid, or even avoid countries receiving higher levels of U.S. aid. U.S. aid might not only indicate a lack of promise of development, but instead a greater likelihood of instability. The very presence of U.S. interest in a country might suggest a concern about volatility. This is illustrated by the frequent U.S. practice of supporting leaders who are unpopular in their own countries, such as the Somozas in Nicaragua, the Shah in Iran, and Musharraf in Pakistan. Aid in these cases might offer some stability, but does not address the underlying issues that provoked U.S. concern in the first place. Therefore, investors might see U.S. aid as a warning sign, and avoid countries that receive higher levels of U.S. aid.
Hypothesis 2: In post-conflict situations, U.S. foreign aid is negatively associated with FDI

Corollary: The effect of time on the signaling effect
There is an interesting implication of aid's informational role in post-conflict situations. We argue that because of the particular characteristics of a post-conflict country, access to information is more problematic right after the end of the conflict. Lacking relevant information, particularly about the government's credibility, investors will look at aid as a signal of international actors' trust or support of the country. This informational effect of aid, however, should fade as time elapses after the conflict. This is consistent with our main argument because we do not posit that aid has a permanent informational role, but that aid assumes that role in a particular context: after a conflict.
Therefore, the impact of aid on FDI is the most potent in the years immediately after the war, and diminishes with time.
Hypothesis 3: In post-conflict situations, the impact of aid on FDI decreases over time. Economic development is measured using GDP per capita in thousands of 2000 U.S. dollars.
Empirical analysis
Countries with more wealthy citizens should be seen as better markets with better infrastructure (e.g., Jensen 2004; Tsai 1994) . GDP growth is the percentage of change in the country's GDP in the previous year (Blanton and Blanton 2007; Li and Resnick 2003) . Trade openness is a country's exports plus imports over GDP (e.g., Asiedu 2002; Büthe and Milner 2008; Jensen 2004 ). Finally, we include a control for pre-war FDI, measured as FDI/GDP the year before the conflict initiated.
We include the following political determinants. Political instability is a count of the number of disturbances such as riots, strikes, anti-government demonstrations or assassinations in a country in a given year (Banks 2011) . Instability should make foreign firms less likely to invest in a country, although evidence of this is mixed (Asiedu 2006; Büthe and Milner 2008; Feng 2001) . Democracy is the 1-7 scale from Freedom House (2009), reversed so that 0 indicates the least-free category, and 6
indicates the most-free category. Empirical results have been mixed for regime type (Jensen 2006; Li and Resnick 2003) .
In addition to economic and political attributes of the recipient country, we take other factors into consideration. It is possible that the intensity of the conflict affects the decision of investing in a post-conflict country. Therefore, we include Conflict intensity, which indicates the number of deaths in the conflict. We use the conflict duration in months as an alternative measure. 21 We also include a series of temporal controls. Cold war is coded 1 for years before 1990.
We also include decade dummies and Year count, a variable counting the years that have elapsed since the conflict ended. All independent variables except the temporal controls are lagged one year to avoid reverse causality. (Sarkees 2000) . The Appendix lists the country-years included in the sample. Descriptive statistics are shown in the online appendix.
The estimation technique is an ordinary least squares regression (OLS). Wooldridge Tests show first-degree serial autocorrelation not to be a problem in the 5-year post-conflict sample, but to appear in larger samples, so we include the autoregression factor when using larger samples (Baltagi 2005:84-5) . We estimate the model using fixed effects because there are important countryspecific FDI determinants (such as factor endowment or business opportunities) that may not be captured by the baseline model. Furthermore, a series of Hausman tests show there is a systematic difference between the results of the two types of models, and that random effects are inconsistent.
Findings
In order to examine whether FDI responds to a particular set of determinants in post-conflict countries, we first run a baseline model on the full sample of developing countries (see Table 1 ).
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Model 1 includes economic and political determinants common in the literature. As expected, FDI is positively associated with Market size, Economic development, GDP growth, Trade openness and Democracy.
Instability does not achieve statistical significance.
[ Two notes regarding Models 1 through 3: first, these models intend to show that the variables included behave as the literature would expect on a conventional sample, in order to address potential concerns over operationalization in the models run on the post-conflict sample.
These models also show the explanatory power of the conventional specification (R 2 ) in both samples. Second, it is not our purpose to explain the effect of aid on the general sample because our theory is specific to post-conflict contexts. [ Table 3 ]
The substantive impact of the aid variables is considerable. Table 3 [ Table 4 ]
Robustness tests
These results are robust to different model specifications, data sources and estimation techniques.
They are robust to the substitution of pre-war FDI by lagged values of FDI, the use of Polity instead of Freedom House, or of GDP instead of population as a measure for market size. They are also robust to the inclusion of other controls, such as FDI t-1 (statistically insignificant), capital openness, total level of U.S. aid (to proxy for changes in American aid policy), squared and cubic splines, and a trend variable. In addition to these standard alternate model specifications, we include additional models in the online appendix to address other possible concerns. Appendix models show that results are also robust to the inclusion of additional controls for aid, and to the use of AidData instead of DAC data. The appendix also includes models with random effects, to allow the inclusion of regional dummies, and/or the treatment of pre-war FDI as a time invariant variable. As a final check, we present in the appendix a set of models to see if the United States is indeed different from other donors. Models suggest that only the United States has a statistically significant negative impact on FDI in post-conflict countries, and that no single country is driving the positive effect of non-U.S. aid.
Note on alternative mechanisms and tests for endogeneity
The results presented above support the hypotheses derived from our theory. They also suggest the implausibility of alternative mechanisms.
For foreign aid to cause FDI through the "infrastructure effect" (e.g., Dollar and Easterly 1999) , aid should boost the host country's economic and/or social capital and make the host country more attractive for investors. Several factors suggest this is not the mechanism driving our results. First, our models include a measure of economic development that should reflect this effect.
Economic development is consistently insignificant in the post-conflict sample. Second, the formation of capital should take longer than a year, and our models use one-year lags. It seems more likely that it is aid's informational effect what explains such an immediate effect on FDI.
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Third, some readers might suggest that the very delivery of the aid attracts FDI (i.e., the building of infrastructure to host the aid agency personnel). It is not clear, however, why only non-U.S. aid would have this effect, and it seems unlikely that aid-supporting infrastructure would have a substantial impact on FDI. One may argue that it is not the actual infrastructure building that attracts FDI, but the expectation that aid will increase it in the near future. In that case, the infrastructure effect would require that foreign aid had a positive effect on the host country's economy, and that investors believed that such a positive effect exists. However, as noted in the second section, this effect is contested in the academic literature and is questioned by the media.
Fourth, if the causal mechanism linking aid to FDI is actual or expected infrastructure building, it is hard to explain the differential effect of U.S and non-U.S. development aid in post-conflict countries. Finally, it is not clear why aid's infrastructure effect would decrease over time and become insignificant after the fourth year in post-conflict developing countries.
Regarding the "financing effect," we find no literature or qualitative evidence suggesting that foreign aid is used to fund FDI profit repatriations. Furthermore, and as with other mechanisms, it is unclear why the financing effect would work for non-U.S. aid, but not U.S. aid. Finally, we do not find evidence of a statistically significant effect of U.S. aid on U.S. FDI. Models that exclude U.S.
FDI from total FDI inflows produce similar results to the reported here. As Kimura and Tod (2010) found, the "vanguard effect" does not seem to link U.S. aid and U.S. FDI.
We also test for the possibility of endogeneity or reverse causality. Models in the paper use independent variables lagged one year to address reverse causality issues, and Appendix models conduct further tests, primarily looking at Model 5, our baseline. First, we use two-year lags instead of and in addition to one-year lags, and our results hold. Second, we run Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimation, where aid variables are treated as endogenous. We also reverse the equation, testing whether FDI determines development aid. FDI is consistently statistically insignificant in regressions predicting U.S. aid. FDI is significant in regressions predicting non-U.S. aid. However, the sign on this coefficient is negative, reversed from when FDI is the dependent variable. Overall, these robustness checks suggest that there is not a problem of endogeneity between aid and FDI.
Finally, we test models that include additional determinants of aid as independent variables, in order to see if any of these variables offer a better explanation of FDI than our aid measures.
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Models are shown in Appendix, and are also run with random effects to include time-invariant variables. 33 Results for hypothesized relationships are robust to the inclusion of these additional aid variables.
Conclusions
This article has examined how foreign aid provides an important signal to investors, affecting FDI flows into post-conflict developing countries. We argued that post-conflict situations are uniquely low-information environments, and therefore investors look for signals to indicate the potential return on their investment. Aid functions as a signal because it suggests some level of trust of the recipient government, on the part of the donor government. However, we also argued that U.S. aid, due to its especially geostrategic nature, could function in a different way than aid from other countries.
Our However, U.S. aid seems to function as a warning sign, and not a security guarantee that safeguards or attracts investments. We describe it as a warning sign because of the U.S. tendency to aid countries not because of their economic potential or need, but instead for geostrategic reasons.
We are somewhat cautious when interpreting the U.S. aid finding, however, because this negative effect is sensitive to the time elapsed after the conflict. Regardless, the substantial difference between the effect of U.S. and non-U.S. aid on FDI is consistent with our theory about aid as a signal, and the importance of whether or not it can be seen as geostrategic. Finally, the research is of normative interest to policymakers. Post-conflict developing countries are especially fragile (e.g., Collier 2003) . The international community benefits when these countries stabilize and develop, and increased FDI offers a path to these outcomes. Aid is a potential remedy, and our research shows that aid from countries other than the United States can offer important unintended benefits. Aid from the United States, however, seems to concern investors more than draw them. We do not suggest that the United States should curtail aid, but instead reconsider the strategic basis for its aid distribution patterns. Furthermore, the United States could increase its work to encourage FDI in developing countries generally. 24 This sample includes countries that have not experienced conflicts, countries experiencing conflict, and post-conflict countries. 25 The lack of statistical significance is not surprising because we expect part of that aid to have a positive impact on FDI, and the rest to have a negative effect. 26 The mean of Non-U.S. aid is .048.
27 Not reported.
28 This is consistent with Bearce and Tirone (2010) . 29 In other words, when the 1980s is the omitted decade, only the 1990s and 2000s are statistically significant, and so on. 30 Interestingly, the results suggest that U.S. aid starts having a positive and statistically significant effect on FDI seven years after the end of the conflict. This positive effect may be related to other mechanisms through which aid can affect FDI in developing countries, which are not tested in this paper. We speculate that after seven years have elapsed since the end of the conflict, the post-conflict country may be in the same situation as any other developing country. 31 The infrastructure effect may explain the longer-term positive effect of U.S. aid on FDI.
Still, it is not clear (and beyond this paper's focus) why non-U.S. aid would not have such effect.
32 Determinants used are those that Alesina and Dollar (2000) found to be statistically significant predictors of aid. Dyadic variables cannot be used due to our unit of analysis, but we include measures of British or French colonial past to capture colonial relations. We also include the Cingranelli-Richards physical integrity rights index (Cingranelli and Richards 2010) because some studies find a relationship between human rights and aid.
